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PERSPECTIVE
The Harmfulness Tax: A Proposal for Regulation
and Taxation of Drugs
Lester Grinspoon*
In the era of Prohibition, it was said of the alcohol problem that,
between the distillers and saloonkeepers on one side and the
prohibitionists on the other, no intelligent person thought there was
any solution at all. The same may be true of the illicit drug problem
today, with its traffickers and users on one side and its moralists and
police on the other. The drug problem is perhaps more serious because the acceptable range of solutions is so narrow. The report of
the President's Commission on Organized Crime and the more recently elaborated Bush-Bennett plan suggest how things are going
right now: there is very little effective opposition to prohibition.
The American war on drugs began with the Harrison Narcotics
Act in 19141 and has escalated in the last twenty years. Federal,
state, and local governments now spend an estimated eight to nine
billion dollars a year on direct drug enforcement activities and millions more to house and feed the drug dealers and users who now
comprise one-third of the federal prison population and contribute
substantially to the need to build more prisons. It is sometimes said
that the pendulum of public opinion swings back and forth between
harshness and leniency in drug control. If there was some swing
toward leniency in the early 1970s, it now appears to be going the
other way, as indicated by the September 1989 White House paper
on national drug control strategy. This paper, referred to as the
Bush-Bennett plan, calls for even more spending on law
enforcement.
Drugs continue to enter the United States at a growing rate despite the war effort. That effort does, however, inflate prices and
keep the drug dealers' franchises lucrative. Another consequence of
the war effort is a black market in drugs, which results in drug-related crime and violence, just as the black market in alcohol did in
the 1920s. The threat to civil liberties grows as the drug warriors,
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already by necessity using entrapment and informers, now make
plans to send in the army and periodically examine everyone's urine.
They are already randomly testing the urine of federal employees.
Any serious approach to this problem demands a recognition of
the problem's complexity and ambiguity. We have to compromise
between social reality and the dream of a drug-free society. We may
have to acknowledge that the use of drugs and alcohol has benefits as
well as dangers. The main obstacle to thinking about any serious
alternative to present policies is that no one in government wants to
give up the symbolism of the criminal law or the commitment that
has been made over the last seventy years, not only in the United
States but all over the world, to treating drugs as a criminal problem.
But there is a great deal of public ambivalence, or, to put it less
kindly, hypocrisy, where this issue is concerned. The moral consensus about the evil of drugs is often passionate but sometimes shallow. We pretend that eliminating drug traffic is like eliminating
slavery or piracy, or sometimes as though it is like eradicating smallpox or malaria. No one would suggest that we legalize piracy or give
up the effort to eradicate infectious diseases, yet conservative authorities like the economist Milton Friedman and The Economist of
London have suggested legalization of drugs. Despite the hysterical
rhetoric we often hear, drug control is not, in the same sense, a settled issue. Rather, the need for that kind of rhetoric is a sign that it is
not a settled issue. On the one hand, it is accepted in public discourse that everything possible has to be done to prevent everyone
from ever using any controlled substances. On the other hand, there
is an informal lore of drug use which is more tolerant. At one time it
looked as though the forms of public discourse and this private language were coming closer together. Now they seem to be drifting
apart again. A type of pretense that we have long abandoned in the
case of alcohol is still considered the only respectable position where
other drugs are concerned. Ambivalence, or hypocrisy, has always
been an undercurrent in the public attitude toward drugs, even while
the criminal control system becomes more and more entrenched.
That undercurrent is what leaves room for the possibility of change.
I would like to suggest a proposal for a non-criminal approach
to recreational drugs. Let currently controlled substances be legalized and taxed. The tax revenues could be used for drug education
and for paying the medical and social costs of drug abuse. A commission could be established to determine these costs separately for
each drug, and the rate of taxation would be adjusted periodically to
reflect the information gathered by the commission. Thus the government could acknowledge the impossibility of eliminating all drug
use and utilize its taxing power and educational authority to encourage safer drug use. Drugs that are now legal, alcohol and tobacco, would not be distinguished from the others.
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To illustrate the kind of calculation involved, it was recently estimated that direct health care costs plus indirect losses in productivity
and earnings due to cigarettes amount to sixty-five billion dollars a
year, or about two dollars per pack. (The exact figures depend on
how costs are defined; for example, the economic loss from smoking
may be "balanced," in a perverse way, by the lowered cost of caring
for chronic disabling diseases of old age in a society where many die
young of smoking-related illness.) Such a taxation policy might be
regarded as a way of making people buy insurance for the risks to
themselves and others in their use of drugs. Life insurance companies already offer substantial discounts in their premiums for nonsmokers, and this insurance preference is slowly being extended to
fire and other insurance policies.
My proposal might be instituted in phases, so that we could adjust and learn more before committing ourselves fully. Phase one
might involve alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis: alcohol and tobacco
because they are already legal; cannabis because it is probably the
least dangerous drug used for pleasure. They could all be sold
through specially licensed outlets at prices determined by the commission. Advertising would be banned. Present prices might be
maintained at the start. As the commission collects more information, pricing could be adjusted to reflect social costs. If this system
works as hoped, data will eventually indicate that these drugs are
causing less and less harm. At that point we could consider bringing
other drugs into the system.
The advantage is that we would no longer have the expense,
corruption, chaos, and terror of the war between drug traffickers and
narcotics agents. In this war, a kind of self-reinforcing cycle is developing as drug enforcement operations begin to pay for themselves
by funds confiscated from the drug traffickers whose operations drug
enforcement operations make enormously profitable. The taxing
system suggested here would establish a different kind of revenue
cycle, in which society would pay for the costs of drug abuse by extracting funds from the drug users in proportion to the amount the
users contribute to the problem. The commission that supervised
this taxing system would also serve as an educator and guide to society-an educator not constrained by the present totally unrealistic
assumption, built into the criminal law, that any use of certain drugs
must be evil or dangerous, while other drugs have a range of benign
and harmful uses. Honest drug education would become possible.
Is it plausible to think that this arrangement would work?
Would it be possible to tax drugs enough to pay for their costs?
Even if it was possible, would drug abuse increase so much that we
would be paying too high a price in personal and social misery? Is
the elasticity of demand great enough that taxing would substantially
influence the amount of drugs consumed, especially by heavy users?
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Evidence on all this is very uncertain, even in the cases of alcohol
and tobacco, where most research has been done. There is much
literature on the distribution curve of alcohol consumption among
individuals in society, most of which concludes that any policy
designed to cut total consumption will at least proportionately reduce alcohol use among problem drinkers and therefore the medical
and social costs of alcohol abuse. That is, the demand is elastic
enough, even among alcohol users who create problems by their use,
to be affected by a rise in price. In fact, there is some evidence that
in countries where the price of alcohol is relatively higher, there are
fewer alcohol problems, and the same is true for states within the
United States.
There is also some evidence of elasticity of demand for heroin
addicts. Several studies suggest that addicts adjust the size of their
habits to the price of heroin. One authority on heroin control has
said that the criminal law would be effective in cutting down heroin
use if it raised the time needed to get a dose of heroin from five
minutes to two hours. This is the "crime tariff." The criminal law
makes it risky to manufacture and distribute the drug. This raises its
cost to the consumer, who therefore needs more time to earn or steal
enough money to obtain it, thus restricting accessibility, so that the
consumer has to spend more time finding out where to get it. The
question is whether through taxation we could impose a limitation
similar to the crime tariff, but more efficiently and with fewer monstrous side effects.
Inelasticity of demand is greatest in the case of tobacco because
nicotine is one of the most highly addictive substances. Nevertheless, it is clear that even here raising the price by taxation has a considerable effect on consumption. Research suggests that for every
ten percent increase in cigarette prices, consumption will decrease
about four percent. Some studies suggest that the price mainly affects the decision to start smoking regularly rather than the quantity
smoked by an already addicted smoker. Thus, although extra taxation would have only a small short-run impact, cigarette smoking
would be reduced in the long run. Other studies find that as the
average cost of tobacco is raised the income elasticity of demand increases; indicating that more poor (rather than rich) people are deterred from cigarette consumption by its rising cost.
One problem confronting any system of authorized sales is the
black market. The drug tax would have to be set low enough to prevent a black market from operating profitably. It is possible to do
this and still considerably reduce demand for the drug, as the case of
alcohol seems to show. On the other hand, it is not clear whether
any tax low enough to prevent a substantial black market would be
high enough to pay for the social and medical costs of the drug use.
Certainly, present taxes on alcohol have not covered the social and
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medical costs attributable to its use. It might prove impossible to
create a system that would make the abusers of a drug, or even its
users, pay for the full costs of abuse. This problem may be practically insoluble. Clearly, however, the criminal law approach offers
no solution for it whatsoever.
We simply do not know the amount of drug use and the seriousness of drug problems that would exist under this kind of systemwhether a legal taxation system would have the same effect as the
current crime tariff. One way to study the issue might be to examine
the effect on gambling habits of the institution of state lotteries in
competition with illegal numbers games. In any case, to undertake
such a bold move we would have to decide that the deprivation of
freedom and the damage wrought by prohibition are greater than
the damage attendant on an increment of drug use, much as we did
when we decided to repeal Prohibition.
There are already some models available for legalization or
quasi-legalization. In Amsterdam there is a union or organization of
drug users and addicts that advises officials. Heroin addicts get free
methadone, and marijuana is sold at openly tolerated cannabis cafes.
Alaska allows its citizens to grow marijuana for household use, and
several other states have reduced the penalties for marijuana possession to fines similar to traffic tickets. In one of these states, Maine, a
three-hundred thousand dollar a year outlay on law enforcement was
converted to a twenty thousand dollar gain for the state treasury with
no increase in marijuana use.
Many might agree that the harmfulness tax approach would
work if it was limited to alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis. But what
about cocaine? Well, consider the present alternatives. The BushBennett plan, perhaps because its authors realize that demand reduction, particularly in the inner city, will be difficult to achieve, aims at
eliminating the production of cocaine. But the so-called Andean
strategy of interrupting South American supplies is bound to fail for
simple reasons of botany. The assumption seems to be that coca
grows only in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. In reality, the coca bush
will grow in any place where certain conditions are met: where there
is an altitude of 1500 to 6000 feet, continuous high humidity, a uniform average temperature of sixty-five degrees throughout the year,
and soil free of limestone. Coca thrives on land that is too poor for
other crops. In the past it has been grown commercially in Jamaica,
Madagascar, India, Ceylon, and especially Java. Even if, implausibly,
the coca bush could be destroyed in the Andes, it would soon be
blooming again elsewhere, just as the cultivation of opium poppies
increased in Iran and Afghanistan when it was curtailed in the Far
East. Let us hope we do not have to see United States soldiers coming home in body bags before we realize that the Andean strategy
will never eliminate the supply of drugs.
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Parenthetically, it is worth noting the absurdity of our national
self-righteousness with respect to Colombian cocaine entrepreneurs.
The United States manufactures six-hundred billion cigarettes a year
and sends one-hundred billion overseas. The five-hundred billion
cigarettes consumed yearly at home cause four-hundred thousand
deaths; by extrapolation, our export trade causes eighty thousand
deaths abroad-far more than the number of deaths cocaine produces in this country. Furthermore, the Colombian government at
least offers no official encouragement to the cocaine traffic; our government subsidizes tobacco cultivation and cigarette exports with the
enthusiastic support of some of the fiercest congressional anti-drug
warriors. Our government has no right to be morally indignant.
What about cocaine demand? The barrage of drug-war publicity
has obscured the fact that the number of people using cocaine is declining. The reason is that the middle class is giving up the drug, just
as it continues to give up the even more addictive nicotine. When
people who are not otherwise desperate become aware of the dangers of drugs, they begin to avoid them. The cocaine problem is not
improving, however, because it is largely a problem of the inner cities. Conditions there are worse now than they were when the Kerner
Commission made its report twenty years ago. Increasingly, cocaine
users are people who feel hopeless, trapped, and alienated, who are
able to find only miserable jobs at low pay or no jobs at all. When
these people are exposed to crack cocaine, they have three choices:
(a) they can ignore it; (b) they can seek respite by using the drug for a
twenty minute holiday during which they feel good about themselves
and hopeful about their situation (it is an illusion, but they have
nothing better); or (c) they can decide to sell crack in hope of getting
rich and buying the luxury products with which our consumer society
tantalizes them. This, at least, is not always an illusion-crack provides a genuine entrepreneurial opportunity for a few.
The social, psychological, and economic pressures moving
young people in the inner city toward options (b) and (c) are enormous. Crack cocaine is powerfully attractive to demoralized people
in a desperate social situation. Admittedly, the harmfulness tax is
not an answer to this problem. But the answer is even less likely to
be found in criminal law enforcement, which the Bush Administration practically equates with prevention. No policy aimed directly at
drugs and drug users can deal with the social issues that are the true
heart of what is loosely, inadequately, and propagandistically labelled the "drug problem."

